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is not self-evident. In this paper, subjective equivalence scales for households in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary are estimated. We use longitudinal EU-SILC data for 2005–2012 following 
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INTRODUCTION
Equivalence scales are commonly employed in income analysis to compare the 
positions of households of various social and economic compositions. The choice 
of weights for this type of analysis dates back to the end of the 19th century (e.g. 
Engel 1895) and is one of the oldest problems continuously discussed in econom-
ics. The question of how to compare the income of different households is vital 
for drawing conclusions from the analysis of poverty and income inequality. The 
term “equivalent income” is invoked in public debates and, therefore, provides 
a rationale for certain measures in economic policy. In this context, the OECD 
scales proposed in 1980s are most commonly cited and used.
There are several alternative methods of weighting household incomes. Most 
recently, Chiappori (2016) proposed to use individual preferences instead of 
household utilities, which eliminates many weaknesses of the traditional equiva-
lence scales. This approach does not require the notion of family utility and does 
not use the comparison of utility across individuals. It is based on how much 
income is needed by an individual living alone, comparing to the same individual 
living in a family in order to reach the same indifference curve over goods and 
services. 
Another method is subjective equivalence scales. The subjective approach uses 
information declared by household members with respect to how they perceive 
their financial situation, as opposed to the traditional approach, which is based 
on decision analysis and rejects declarations as a source of information (Veen-
hoven 2002; Schokkaert et al. 2011). The subjective approach is built around 
declarations about the expected minimum income or the subjective assessment 
of pre-determined levels of income expressed by participants in a representa-
tive household survey, which contrasts with the “revealed preference” approach 
prevailing in mainstream economics. The method was proposed in the 1970s, but 
its empirical nature, coupled with no background in the economic choice theory, 
made it scarcely popular with economists (e.g. Van Praag 1971; Goedhart et al. 
1977; van Praag – van der Sar 1988; Kepteyn et al. 1985). 
Nevertheless, declarative data, including those concerning the subjective as-
sessment of income, started to be commonly used at the turn of the 21st century 
(more in Kahneman – Krueger 2006; MacKerron 2012). Recent years have also 
seen some interesting papers that use subjective declarations about income to 
analyse equivalence scales (van Praag – Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; Bishop et al. 
2006, 2014; Bollinger et al. 2012; de Ree et al. 2013). 
Our paper draws on the method used in a recent study of Bishop et al. (2014), 
but it is applied to a different type of data. The results were obtained on the lon-
gitudinal data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Condi-
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tions (EU-SILC) survey for three countries, which have not been studied before: 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.1 
The subjective equivalence scales we estimated show a “reasonable” behaviour 
in the sense that they increase with the increase in the number of household mem-
bers. At the same time, they differ from the scale calculated with the reference 
method. Both scales – the new one based on the longitudinal data and one from 
cross-section data – differ from the OECD scales commonly applied in practice. 
The subjective scales are lower, which suggests a larger extent of the economies 
of scale at the household level. They indicate a decreasing marginal cost of an 
additional child, while the OECD scales assume no changes in that cost. 
The identification strategy assumes a log-linear relationship between the cur-
rent and the declared minimum incomes, and that those with the current income 
above their stated minimum level overestimate the true minimum value, while 
those with the current income below their declared minimum income underesti-
mate it. According to Grodner – Salas (2013), the above assumptions enable an 
estimation of the true (unobserved) minimum income, even though only those 
with the current income equal to the declared income state the correct income. 
However, this also means that a sample selection affected by a perception error 
should not significantly change the results. This conjecture prompted us to check 
the scales based on full samples against those obtained from observations for 
which the relative perception error (the ratio of the difference between a declared 
minimum income and disposable income to disposable income) does not exceed 
25%.
The remaining part of this paper describes the methods, followed by the esti-
mation strategy and its results. A summary concludes the paper.
ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND METHOD
Equivalence scales are most commonly defined as the relation of the cost of liv-
ing of a household of a given demographic composition (such as a couple with 
two children) to the cost of living of a reference household, which is usually a 
single-member household. Such a scale can be presented as:
  (1)
where p is prices, identical for all households, u is unobservable utilities, and f 
and r are subscripts for household categories. Adopting the method of analysis 
1 The similar study of Bishop et al. (2014) used the same data for the euro zone countries only.
  ( , , ),
( , , )
C p u fD p u
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
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described in Goedhart et al. (1977), we assume that the values of the C(.) function 
may be inferred from the declarations of minimum income y*min, which allows us 
to write: y*min (x) = C(p,u*min,x), where x designates the household category and 
u*min is the unobserved utility level.
In this approach, the equivalence scale is defined by assuming that house-
holds having an income on par with the declared minimum income have the same 
utility. Therefore, with the declarations of households with disposable income y 
close to the minimum declared values ymin , it is possible to estimate monotone 
parameters of the increasing function y*min (x) = f(ymin,x). Thus, the equivalence 
scale can be formulated as:
  (2)
In practice, the logarithmic and linear form for f (ymin,x) is most commonly 
adopted.
Grodner and Salas (2013) note that the model should be estimated based on 
observations for which the declared minimum income is close to the disposable 
income. However, such observations are usually too scarce to yield any statisti-
cally significant results. In such situations, following Goedhart et al. (1977), it is 
assumed that households having a disposable income above the minimum, over-
estimate the real level of such income, whereas those with an actually insufficient 
income underestimate that level. With this identification condition, it is possible 
to determine the unobserved minimum income, even if the number of observa-
tions for which the values of disposable income are close to the declared levels is 
small. Since the EU-SILC set provides information on a large number of observa-
tions, we decided to test how the choice of the sample size affects the equivalence 
scale estimates. The decision to use two samples could be linked to the discussion 
in Goedhart et al. (1977), who advocate using the 100% sample if a number of re-
quired observations is insufficient, and Grodner – Salas (2013), who make a case 
for using the smaller sample. Our estimation has been conducted on a complete 
set of data (the “100 sample”) and on a sample limited to those observations for 
which the relative error does not exceed 25% (the “25 sample”).
The longitudinal data used in the study allow us to control for the existence of 
time-invariant, unobservable characteristics of individual households affecting 
the dependent variable. The existence of such effects causes the inefficiency of 
the OLS estimator if they are not correlated with explanatory variables, or leads 
to a bias of that estimator if such a correlation exists.
*
*
*
( )
( )
( , ) ( , )
( , ) 
min min
min
min min
y f f y fD p u
y r f y r
 
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The linear model assuming the existence of individual effects for the relation 
between the logarithm of the declared minimum income and explanatory vari-
ables is defined as follows:
 
, , ,
min
, 0 1 , 2 2 3 3 1 ,ln( ) ln( ) ( )i t i t i ti t i t n n i ty y z z z v uβ β β β β        (3)
where v1 describes the time-invariant unobservable individual effect associated 
with the characteristics of a household and ui,t is the general random effect.
When estimating parameters β0, β1 …, βn using the least squares method (the 
so-called pooled OLS, or POLS), we risk obtaining inconsistent parameters if in-
dividual characteristics are correlated with regressors. Additionally, the existence 
of fixed individual effects leads to total random errors (vi +ui,t) for observations 
concerning the same household being correlated together, which results in the in-
efficiency of the OLS estimator. If there is no correlation between the individual 
effect and the explanatory variables, the random effects (RE) estimator is the ef-
fective and consistent estimator. However, when modelling income variables, it is 
more reasonable to assume the existence of a correlation in the empirical model, 
which implies the inconsistency of the RE estimator. In such a case, the consistent 
estimator is the fixed effects (FE) estimator obtained after the model formula is 
transformed into the following form:
  , , ,
min
, 1 , 2 2 3 3 ,ln( ) ln( ) i t i t i ti t i t n n i ty y z z z uβ β β β          (4)
where min min min, ,i t i t iy y y  ,  , ,i t i t iy y y  , 
, ,i t i t i
k k kz z z  for  and , ,i t i t iu u u  .
By applying this transformation, the fixed factor is eliminated from the mod-
el as ,i i t iv u u  . Parameter estimates made using the FE method are precise 
enough only if the corresponding regressors are sufficiently time-variant. If their 
variation is only slight, then standard errors for the parameter estimates are high, 
which makes it difficult to extrapolate the results to observations from the outside 
of the sample. More to the point, the transformation of fixed effects removes not 
only unobservable fixed effects, but also all time-invariant regressors.
Using the FE estimator, we assume no correlation between the error and the 
explanatory variables, i.e. E(Xi,t * vi) = 0, whereas for the RE estimator we ad-
ditionally assume that E(Xi,t * vi) = 0. The Wooldridge test can be used to verify 
whether the second of these orthogonality conditions is true, thus allowing for the 
selection of the correct estimation method (Wooldridge 2010).
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Data
The presented results were obtained using the longitudinal data from the EU-
SILC survey for 2005–2012. EU-SILC is a survey covering all EU countries and 
aimed at providing data on income poverty and social exclusion. The survey col-
lects social, demographic, and income data about households and their members. 
In Poland, the EU-SILC survey has been run since 2005. A rotating household 
panel is used in the longitudinal survey (with a 4-year rotation in most participat-
ing countries).
For the three countries included in the analysis, namely Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, we had a total of 640,000 observations in approximately 
240,000 households. The selected countries are post-communist countries with 
a similar political and economic history after World War II. In 2012, the GDP 
at market prices as measured in PPS per inhabitant was about 60% of the EU15 
average in Poland and Hungary, and it reached a level close to 75% in the Czech 
Republic (Table A1 in the Appendix). In each country, labour productivity is be-
low the average for the EU15, while the shares of manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors in the total gross value added are above the average. On the other hand, 
the importance of such sectors as “public administration, defence, education, hu-
man health and social work activities” as well as “professional, scientific and 
technical activities; administrative” sectors is lower in the analysed group. Since 
the three countries are quite different from the advanced European countries, it is 
interesting to verify to what extent the scales for these Central European countries 
are consistent with those previously calculated for more advanced countries.
Also, it should be noted that the selected countries are not economically or 
socially identical, despite the 50 years of their common history after 1945. The 
Czech Republic is the most advanced in terms of per capita GDP and labour 
productivity levels. The position of the Czech Republic is also confirmed by its 
higher HDI ranking. The countries also differed (or differ) in their family policy 
expenditure in the years of 2005–2012, with Hungary’s spending between 3.3%–
3.5% of GDP, the Czech Republic between 1.7% and 1.8% of GDP, and Poland 
just between 1.06% and 1.07% (OECD 2016). Financial transfers accounted for 
the largest share in the overall support to families in Hungary. The Czech Re-
public had the smallest share of aid in the form of services, but the largest share 
of support in the form of tax reliefs and tax credits compared to the other two 
countries. According to the report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015), 
the average public aid per child was EUR 530 in Poland, over EUR 1100 in the 
Czech Republic, and nearly EUR 2000 in Hungary.
The variable explained in the regression model is the declared minimum in-
come, the value of which is derived from the question, “In your opinion, what is 
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the very lowest net monthly income your household would have to have in order 
to make ends meet?” The income variable among the explanatory variables is the 
disposable income adjusted for each year and country by harmonised consumer 
price indices published by Eurostat.2 Observations on the extreme values of mini-
mum income and disposable income per household member (observations in the 
first and last centile) were excluded from the study.
The analysis covered six types of households: a couple with one child (a2k1); 
a couple with two children (a2k2); and families with one to four adults and no 
children (a1k0 to a4k0). A child is defined according to the definition of OECD, 
that is, as a person below 14 years of age. The populations of the two analysed 
samples, i.e. the “100 sample” and the “25 sample”, once the issue of missing 
data in income variables have been eliminated, are described in Tables A2 and 
A3 in the Appendix. Data were most frequently missing in the Polish panel for 
2005–2008 (between 10 and 13% for various types of households, with the larg-
est share for a1k1 households at 17.9%). For later panels, the issue of missing 
data was less common and usually did not exceed 10%, although, at 16.1%, the 
percentage was still high in the 2009–2012 panel for a1k1 households. In Hun-
gary, the percentage of missing income data was below 10%, and in the latest 
panel for 2009–2012, it was below 5%. The problem of missing data was virtu-
ally non-existent in the case of the Czech Republic. Therefore, the income data 
can be considered satisfactory.
The most numerous households in all the countries are a2k0 households. Upon 
limiting the sample size (“25 sample”), a1k0 households become the most numer-
ous in the Czech Republic. They are the second most numerous in the other coun-
tries. Tables A4 and A5 show the percentages of households, by type, which did not 
change their composition between the panels. This information is vital for the abil-
ity to estimate the model using the FE estimator. Changes were the least frequent 
in a1k0 households. Over 90% of a1k0 households in all the countries continued as 
such for all the years of the survey. This is hardly surprising considering that they 
include households of single elderly persons. Changes were much more frequent 
in the other types of households (in the case of families with children, a2k1 and 
a2k2, between 50 and 60% of households did not change their type), and this varia-
tion can be observed in both the entire sample and the “25 sample”. Such an extent 
of variation makes it possible to conduct a panel analysis with fixed effects.
2  The variable used in this study is HY020 (total disposable income) comprising income from 
work (employment or self-employment), old age benefits, insurance benefits (survivor’s ben-
efits, sickness benefits, disability benefits), family/children-related allowances, housing al-
lowances, and social aid (for details, see “Description of target variables: Cross-sectional and 
Longitudinal”, EU-SILC 065, 2011).
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RESULTS
Equation (4) was estimated using OLS and FE methods. We discuss the results of 
both methods since a correlation between fixed effects in time and explanatory 
variables was found using the Wooldridge test (Table A6), and the OLS results 
are presented as a proxy of more traditional results obtained from cross-sectional 
data.3 Three kinds of results are discussed below. The first one is derived from the 
fact that the income elasticities obtained from the FE estimator are smaller than 
those from the OLS method (Tables A7, A8). The FE values are around 0.3 for 
the restricted sample and 0.1 for the unrestricted one, and 0.7 and 0.4 for the OLS 
method. It is interesting that there is no visible country effect within any of the 
estimation methods. The income elasticities estimates measure the importance 
of the adaptation effect that was described in Goedhart et al. (1997). The role 
of the effect is related to the slope of the relationship between the log-minimum 
income and log-disposable income presented in Goedhart et al. (1997: Figure 3). 
A smaller slope (lower income elasticity) means faster adaption of the subjec-
tive minimum income to the true minimum value. This is a desired result since 
with smaller elasticities, the differences between declarations and the unobserved 
minimum income are smaller. Controlling for the correlation associated with the 
existence of fixed effects in time reveals also a stronger effect of additional mem-
bers in a household on the minimum income. For instance, the semi-elasticities 
for an a2k0 household and for a2k2 are over a dozen p.p. higher for the FE esti-
mates than for the OLS ones. 
Since unobserved time-invariant variables are significant, the conclusions 
based on the OLS estimates overestimate the role of the current income and un-
derestimate the economies of scale when the expected subjective minimum in-
come is estimated. The FE method indicating a weaker role of the current income 
and a stronger role of the household structure seems to be more intuitively ap-
pealing. That is why we prefer the FE estimator, which suggests that subjective 
declarations about the minimum income are less subjective and are more objec-
tive in the sense that they are closer to the unobserved objective values than it 
would result from the OLS approach. 
However, this result may be biased by observations with high values of the per-
ception errors that are taken into account in the estimation. As we have mentioned 
3  Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrated that the traditionally computed values of standard devia-
tion for the FE estimator are significantly underestimated if autocorrelation of the random 
factor is present. In such cases, it is proposed to use estimators that are robust to clustering and 
treat each observation (e.g. a household) as a separate cluster. For this reason, we apply Huber-
White estimators, which are cluster-robust (cluster-robust Huber-White standard errors).
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above, restricting the sample on the perception errors may help to overcome the 
negative consequences of an idiosyncratic measurement error problem. When 
only those observations with the relative perception error (a difference between 
declared minimum income and disposable income over disposable income) be-
low 25% are included in the estimation, the values of income elasticity estimate 
increase. This is not surprising since the concave relationship between the current 
income and the declared minimum level has been assumed. However, the esti-
mates of 0.7 for the OLS25 models make them a bit suspicious. The results for the 
FE25 models – around 0.3 – are more sensible. Changing sample sizes increas-
es income elasticities, but does not make much difference in the estimates of a 
household type effect. The choice between the FE25 model and the FE100 model 
must indeed rely on ethical considerations. If we believe that the true minimum 
income should be calculated only on the basis of declarations stated by those who 
are on the verge of subjective minimum level, than the FE 25 model should be 
applied. This approach can be motivated by a claim that only such people know 
the value of the true minimum income. If, however, we think that people whose 
current income is significantly different to their declared minimum amount also 
should be taken into consideration, the whole sample should be used. The main 
distinction here is whether we accept that those who are not at the verge of mini-
mum income should decide what the minimum income is. As we can see from 
Figure 1, this decision influences the values of the subjective equivalence scales 
that appeared in poverty and income analysis (Figure 1 and Table A9).
Figure 1 presents the three most interesting subjective scales – FE25, FE100 
and OLS100 – and the modified OECD scale (the values for the scales from all 
models together with confidence intervals are given in Table A9). The scales are 
reasonable – they are not decreasing with the number of household members. The 
differences between the expert scales (the OECD scale and the square root scale) 
and the subjective scales increase with the number of household members. They 
are the smallest for a2k0 and a2k1 households and the greatest for a4k0 ones. 
The values for the OLS100 model for Poland are below those for the euro zone in 
Bishop et al. (2014). The values for the Czech Republic and Hungary are above 
that benchmark. In most cases, the differences hover around 5%, which gives us 
the confidence in the meaningfulness of the discussed results. 
The values for the FE100 models do not differ much from those from the 
OLS100 models. The only noticeable differences are in the case of a2k1 and 
a2k2 households in the Czech Republic and Hungary. For the Czech Republic, 
the scales are 1.47 for a2k1 and 1.56 for a2k2, with the estimates for Hungary 
of, respectively, 1.44 and 1.54. Larger differences are noticed after the sample 
restriction is added (Table A9). The differences between the OLS100 model and 
the OLS25 model come up to 30%, meaning that limiting the sample size to those 
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Figure 1. Subjective equivalence scales for selected models
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data. 
Notes: The number of observations used for calculations can be found in the Appendix, Table A7 (FE25) and 
Table A8 (FE100 and OLS100).
A) Poland
B) Czech Republic
C) Hungary
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with the disposable income close to the minimum level leads to a larger impor-
tance of the economies of scale. Implementing both changes – putting the restric-
tion on a sample size and applying the FE estimator – increases the values of the 
equivalence scale by a factor of about 1.1 for Poland and for childless households 
(a2k0, a3k0 and a4k0) in the Czech Republic. The values for a2k1 and a2k2 
households in the Czech Republic increase by a factor of about 1.03. Changes in 
Hungary for households with children (a2k1 and a2k2) take a different direction: 
the values of the scale are smaller by a factor of 0.9. For other household types, 
the values rise by a factor of 1.03. 
As we see, the introduction of both changes may shift the scale in any direction 
from the baseline case of the OLS100 model. This happens because controlling 
for fixed effects decreases the values of a scale (i.e. it increases the role of econo-
mies of scale), while restricting a sample makes them larger (i.e. it decreases the 
role of economies of scale). It is hard to predict which effect is stronger. 
Another conclusion concerns the marginal cost of children which is implied 
by the equivalence scales. According to Bishop et al. (2014), the additional cost 
caused by a first child in a couple is 30% of a cost for an a1k0 household in the 
euro zone. The respective estimate for a second child is 0.14. They reported the 
smallest value of 0.15 for the first child (the Netherlands) and the largest one of 
0.60 (Ireland). Our baseline results from the OLS100 models are in line with these 
estimates. Our scales show a declining marginal cost of a child, which is a typical 
result for a subjective approach and stays in contrast with the OECD approach 
that assumes a constant marginal cost. Our OLS100 estimates are 0.21 for Poland, 
0.33 for Hungary, and 0.36 for the Czech Republic, in each case for the first child, 
which makes them similar to the OECD approach with the cost of 0.3. 
The restricted FE models show smaller estimates of the marginal cost of the 
first child for Hungary (0.14) and the Czech Republic (0.28), and there is no 
change for Poland (0.31). The marginal costs decrease mostly due to the change 
in the estimation method. The sample selection effect is weaker. This again high-
lights the importance of controlling the fixed effects. The additional cost brought 
on by the second child is considerably lower than that of the first one. This comes 
as no surprise, bearing in mind the results in Bishop et al. (2014). Estimates for 
the OLS100 models are: 0.15 for Poland, 0.13 for the Czech Republic, and 0.11 
for Hungary. Results for the FE25 cases are even lower: 0.041 for Poland, 0.08 
for Hungary, and 0.09 for the Czech Republic. Such small values are consistent 
with the estimates in the reference paper, where we find 0.08 for Slovakia, 0.06 
for Austria, and 0.07 for France.
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CONCLUSION
The OECD equivalence scales developed in the 1980s are frequently applied in 
social studies. However, there are interesting alternatives to this dominant ap-
proach. One of them is a subjective equivalence scale based on the declared 
values of minimum income. Our paper draws on this approach by presenting 
estimates of the subjective equivalence scales for Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary using the method proposed in Goedhart et al. (1977). Recently, this 
method was applied in Bishop et al. (2014) to estimate the subjective equivalence 
scale in the euro zone using cross-sectional data from the European Union Statis-
tics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey. 
We used the longitudinal data from the EU-SILC survey, which allowed us 
to control the bias resulting from the correlation of the time-invariant random 
factor and the current disposable income. We incorporated a discussion of the 
result sensitivity to sample selection based on the difference between the dispos-
able income held and the declared minimum income. For the purpose, we used a 
limited sample of households for whom the said difference did not exceed 25%. 
The objective of the analysis was to test whether the perception error affects the 
results of the equivalence scale estimates.
The application of the fixed effects estimator demonstrated a stronger signifi-
cance of the adaptation effect, making the current income less important for the 
subjective minimum income. This is a much desirable result, since we would like 
to have the true unobserved minimum income that is treated as a measure of the 
cost of living to be independent from the current income situation. That is why 
smaller estimates of the income elasticities would be highly desirable, and it is 
supported by Schwarze (2003) and Knight – Gunatilaka (2012). By limiting the 
samples, we showed that the short-run income aspirations of households with 
income close to the minimum income are more sensitive to income changes than 
those postulated when the full sample is used.
The estimated subjective equivalence scales are different for different coun-
tries, which show that using a common OECD scale is an oversimplification. 
Controlling the time-invariant fixed effects and limiting the sample size reveal a 
smaller degree of the economies of scale in households in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic, and higher in Hungary. The differences between the expert scales (the 
OECD scale and the square root scale) and the subjective ones increase with the 
number of household members. The subjective marginal cost of a first child is 
lower than the cost of a second one, which makes the subjective scales different 
from the expert scales. Marginal costs are lower when we control for the fixed 
effects, but their levels still fall within those known from the literature. 
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The comparison of the three Central European countries has revealed the dif-
ferences in the size of economies of scale of a household, despite similarities in 
economic development and the post-war history. It seems that a more in-depth 
analysis linking the generosity of the social transfer system to the perceived ex-
tent of the economies of scale as well as the role of country specific cultural 
characteristics could be helpful in explaining these differences. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Information on economic and social situation in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary
PL HU CZ EU15
2005 2012 2005 2012 2005 2012 2005 2012
GDP at market prices 
(PPS per inhabitant)
45.5 61.4 56.0 60.9 70.1 74.2 100.0 100.0
Nominal labour productivity 
per hour worked
42.2 52.7 49.0 59.4 59.2 62.4 100.0 100.0
Share in gross value added 
- Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing
3.7 3.2 5.04 4.63 2.55 2.38 1.82 1.50
- Manufacturing 19.09 18.08 22.01 22.09 25.39 24.22 16.83 15.40
- Wholesale and retail trade, 
transport, accommodation, 
and food
25.18 25.12 17.49 18.09 20.40 18.20 19.28 18.65
- Construction 6.45 8.72 5.36 4.14 6.62 6.17 6.01 5.57
- Public administration, 
defence, education, human 
health, and social work 
activities
15.70 15.04 18.63 16.97 14.84 14.93 18.59 19.60
- Professional, scientific, 
and technical activities; 
administrative
6.29 6.95 7.96 9.06 6.48 6.55 10.02 10.55
People at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion (2)
n.a. 26.7 32.1 33.5 19.6 15.4 21.7 23.1
Total expenditure on social 
protection as percentage of 
GDP
20.0 26.4 21.5 21.4 18.0 20.5 26.8 29.5
HDI rank in 2015 (2) X 36 X 44 X 28 X X
Sources: Eurostat, Human Development Report 2015, UNDP, USA.
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Table A2. Observations by types of households for the 100 sample
2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 2008–2011 2009–2012
PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU
a1k0 356 864 305 366 772 341 355 546 418 415 397 391 336 562 517
a2k0 588 1090 410 658 948 481 627 726 493 724 554 458 685 711 619
a2k1 180 215 95 218 220 120 209 157 149 196 118 111 198 143 193
a2k2 219 307 96 210 299 113 214 193 146 189 130 111 198 155 139
a3k0 281 288 145 318 228 175 295 194 152 297 142 156 262 183 206
a4k0 127 93 75 136 71 56 133 65 66 111 47 62 119 53 86
total 1751 2857 1126 1906 2538 1286 1833 1881 1424 1932 1388 1289 1798 1807 1760
obs. with 
disposable 
income 
below 
minimum 
income
995 1100 290 1113 1404 577 1066 1159 483 1076 1020 1211 908 985 1309
other types:
a1k1 26 63 33 34 58 18 24 28 32 30 20 33 22 42 44
a1k2 13 31 10 15 30 6 11 30 21 14 18 12 8 21 16
a2k3 62 41 36 73 55 31 57 23 34 61 30 28 56 14 55
a3k1 133 107 44 117 93 60 129 62 92 108 42 68 116 54 83
a3k2 55 32 20 75 27 31 69 18 34 46 17 25 65 18 33
a4k1 74 14 21 87 21 25 66 13 26 65 14 22 72 14 30
other 226 49 63 237 36 47 221 36 51 198 19 73 179 26 68
Note: Observations after removal of missing data in income variables. Counted for the first year of each panel wave. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
Table A3. Observations by types of households for the 25 sample
2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 2008–2011 2009–2012
PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU
a1k0 105 438 146 150 346 146 152 283 150 195 204 143 153 264 246
a2k0 187 452 147 222 389 143 212 282 124 275 223 126 233 271 220
a2k1 40 57 34 53 66 31 47 48 34 64 31 29 47 56 50
a2k2 59 101 27 67 102 24 61 58 30 54 44 25 64 40 36
a3k0 80 69 37 77 64 28 79 53 33 68 31 35 64 42 52
a4k0 22 19 16 35 10 12 28 11 11 29 7 12 21 13 18
total 493 1136 407 604 977 384 579 735 382 685 540 370 582 686 622
obs. with dispos-
able income 
below minimum 
income
261 457 71 363 625 202 379 535 188 460 483 382 380 487 439
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Table A3. continued
2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 2008–2011 2009–2012
PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU
other types:
a1k1 6 22 14 8 20 5 8 9 2 11 8 9 9 9 17
a1k2 4 11 3 7 14 1 3 10 7 3 6 8 2 12 5
a2k3 13 25 11 24 19 11 19 5 13 26 14 7 19 5 18
a3k1 32 24 9 22 27 10 33 19 21 37 13 15 29 19 19
a3k2 17 8 8 20 14 10 18 4 7 12 5 6 18 7 5
a4k1 15 2 6 15 10 5 17 2 7 17 4 5 10 7 7
other 50 11 18 60 11 8 58 8 9 51 5 19 38 5 12
Note: Observations after removal of missing data in income variables. Counted for the first year of each panel wave. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data. 
Table A4. Households remaining in the same type of household for all the years 
of the panel for the 100 sample (%)
2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 2008–2011 2009–2012
PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU
a1k0 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95
a1k1 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.42 0.59 0.60 0.59
a1k2 0.38 0.58 0.50 0.33 0.53 0.33 0.27 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.62 0.38
a2k0 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.86 0.80 0.85 0.82 0.83
a2k1 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.63 0.55 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.41 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.65
a2k2 0.60 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.67
a2k3 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.43 0.65 0.52 0.63 0.61 0.48 0.29 0.51
a3k0 0.57 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.69 0.78 0.61 0.69 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.66 0.69 0.69
a3k1 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.28 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.43 0.38 0.39 0.30
a3k2 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.56 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.45 0.50 0.21
a4k0 0.42 0.65 0.52 0.55 0.72 0.43 0.38 0.63 0.48 0.45 0.70 0.66 0.47 0.70 0.64
a4k1 0.32 0.36 0.52 0.49 0.29 0.40 0.38 0.23 0.35 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.33
other 0.69 0.57 0.57 0.67 0.72 0.77 0.69 0.44 0.80 0.74 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.74
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
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Table A5. Households remaining in the same type of household for all the years 
of the panel for the 25 sample (%)
2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 2008–2011 2009–2012
PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU PL CZ HU
a1k0 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.97
a1k1 0.67 0.45 0.57 0.38 0.60 0.40 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.27 0.75 0.44 0.33 0.56 0.47
a1k2 0.00 0.55 0.67 0.29 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.63 0.50 0.67 0.40
a2k0 0.86 0.90 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.82 0.85
a2k1 0.65 0.61 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.74 0.53 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.55 0.57 0.66
a2k2 0.73 0.69 0.52 0.58 0.73 0.50 0.62 0.64 0.80 0.65 0.64 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.61
a2k3 0.62 0.68 0.45 0.46 0.63 0.45 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.50 0.57 0.71 0.47 0.20 0.56
a3k0 0.54 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.64 0.63
a3k1 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.45 0.48 0.30 0.52 0.32 0.62 0.32 0.38 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.32
a3k2 0.35 0.38 0.25 0.35 0.36 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.71 0.25 0.40 0.33 0.44 0.57 0.20
a4k0 0.50 0.47 0.56 0.51 0.70 0.42 0.36 0.64 0.64 0.52 0.57 0.67 0.48 0.69 0.67
a4k1 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.27 0.40 0.60 0.35 0.00 0.43 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.29
other 0.70 0.73 0.61 0.67 0.91 0.88 0.60 0.50 0.89 0.78 0.60 0.74 0.66 0.80 0.75
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
 
Table A6. Values of statistics F in the Wooldridge test for insignificance 
of the correlation between the individual effect and regressors
PL CZ HU
Model 25 1863.07 1461.67 424.44
Model 100 1245.44 811.42 554.48
Sources: Wooldridge (2010: 280–281). Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
Table A7. Results of regression for the 25 sample (2005–2012)
PL25 CZ25 HU25
Variable OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Income 0.7681*** 0.2736*** 0.7451*** 0.2783*** 0.7067*** 0.3294***
a2k0 0.0955*** 0.2752*** 0.1063*** 0.3062*** 0.1301*** 0.2397***
a3k0 0.1594*** 0.4227*** 0.1950*** 0.4290*** 0.1830*** 0.3448***
a4k0 0.1545*** 0.4342*** 0.2331*** 0.4985*** 0.2518*** 0.4947***
a2k1 0.1404*** 0.4166*** 0.1898*** 0.4279*** 0.2089*** 0.3016***
a2k2 0.1689*** 0.4336*** 0.1946*** 0.4615*** 0.2182*** 0.3353***
2006 –0.0367* 0.0360* 0.0314*** 0.0730*** 0.0277* 0.0492***
2007 –0.0380* 0.0636*** 0.0444*** 0.1351*** –0.0512*** –0.0194
2008 –0.0411* 0.0976*** 0.0643*** 0.1636*** 0.1015*** 0.1551***
2009 –0.0331 0.1593*** 0.0796*** 0.2357*** 0.1017*** 0.1873***
2010 –0.0788*** 0.0207 0.0608*** 0.1950*** 0.1082*** 0.1454***
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Table A7. continued
PL25 CZ25 HU25
Variable OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
2011 –0.0555** 0.0961*** 0.0675*** 0.2179*** –0.0204 0.0037
2012 –0.0740*** 0.0603** 0.0718*** 0.2427*** –0.0031 0.0270
Cons 1.9010*** 5.8713*** 2.0634*** 5.9620*** 2.2882*** 5.3782***
N 11699 11699 16197 16197 8540 8540
r2_a 0.7838 0.2687 0.8213 0.2902 0.7432 0.2947
Corr. 0.4344 0.5015 0.4440
sigma_u 0.2657 0.2078 0.2010
sigma_e 0.1826 0.1592 0.2057
Notes: Sample limited to observations for which the relative difference between the minimum income and dis-
posable income is less than 25%. Standard deviations of the FE estimator were calculated while controlling for 
the possible correlation of an individual random error in time. *: significant at a significance level of 5%, **: 
significant at a significance level of 1%,,***: significant at a significance level of 0.1%.
Source: Wooldridge (2010: 280–281). Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
Table A8. Results of regression for the 100 sample (2005–2012)
PL100 CZ100 HU100
Variable POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE
Income 0.4147*** 0.1072*** 0.3685*** 0.0989*** 0.3683*** 0.1002***
a2k0 0.1702*** 0.3063*** 0.2035*** 0.2749*** 0.2082*** 0.2246***
a3k0 0.2680*** 0.4345*** 0.3059*** 0.3905*** 0.3199*** 0.3868***
a4k0 0.2969*** 0.4930*** 0.3904*** 0.4741*** 0.4451*** 0.5050***
a2k1 0.2538*** 0.4259*** 0.3499*** 0.3494*** 0.3407*** 0.3287***
a2k2 0.3094*** 0.5037*** 0.3891*** 0.3990*** 0.3856*** 0.3916***
2006 0.0015 0.0665*** 0.0589*** 0.0886*** 0.0648*** 0.0931***
2007 0.0093 0.1031*** 0.1100*** 0.1702*** –0.1062*** –0.0357*
2008 0.0272* 0.1497*** 0.1417*** 0.2060*** 0.1184*** 0.1994***
2009 0.0375** 0.2082*** 0.1901*** 0.2994*** 0.1682*** 0.2871***
2010 –0.0816*** 0.0350** 0.1524*** 0.2490*** 0.1318*** 0.2292***
2011 –0.0260* 0.1202*** 0.1857*** 0.2870*** –0.0678*** 0.0160
2012 –0.0544*** 0.0896*** 0.1977*** 0.3195*** –0.0699*** 0.0272
Cons. 4.8097*** 7.2707*** 5.2148*** 7.5380*** 5.0617*** 7.2902***
N 36481 36481 41317 41317 26946 26946
r2_a 0.4710 0.1441 0.4957 0.1509 0.4433 0.1826
Corr. 0.1883 0.3253 0.2690
sigma_u 0.3296 0.3005 0.2951
sigma_e 0.2423 0.2067 0.3010
Note: Standard deviations of the FE estimator were calculated while controlling for the possible correlation of 
an individual random error in time. *: significant at a significance level of 5%, **: significant at a significance 
level of 1% ,***: significant at a significance level of 0.1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
Table A9. Equivalent scales calculated after the FE and OLS estimations with confidence intervals
604 LESZEK MORAWSKI – MAŁGORZATA KALBARCZYK-STĘCLIK – RAFAŁ MIŚTA
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
PL CZ HU
OECD
Square 
root
Bish-
op
CIL CI CIU CIL CI CIU CIL CI CIU
FE
25
a1k0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 X
a2k0 1.339 1.461 1.582 1.456 1.528 1.601 1.331 1.430 1.528 1.500 1.414 X
a2k1 1.541 1.775 2.008 1.669 1.809 1.949 1.351 1.568 1.785 1.800 1.732 X
a3k0 1.602 1.789 1.977 1.648 1.812 1.976 1.460 1.672 1.884 2.000 1.732 X
a2k2 1.532 1.816 2.101 1.717 1.895 2.074 1.350 1.649 1.948 2.100 2.000 X
a4k0 1.532 1.818 2.104 1.737 1.995 2.254 1.713 2.091 2.469 2.500 2.000 X
FE
10
0
a1k0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 X
a2k0 1.353 1.409 1.466 1.310 1.357 1.403 1.222 1.284 1.345 1.500 1.414 X
a2k1 1.519 1.611 1.704 1.389 1.474 1.558 1.323 1.441 1.559 1.800 1.732 X
a3k0 1.547 1.627 1.707 1.464 1.542 1.621 1.429 1.537 1.645 2.000 1.732 X
a2k2 1.633 1.758 1.882 1.460 1.557 1.654 1.376 1.545 1.714 2.100 2.000 X
a4k0 1.624 1.737 1.850 1.568 1.692 1.817 1.599 1.753 1.906 2.500 2.000 X
O
LS
25
a1k0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 X
a2k0 1.434 1.509 1.584 1.461 1.517 1.574 1.492 1.558 1.624 1.500 1.414 X
a2k1 1.600 1.832 2.064 1.975 2.106 2.237 1.886 2.038 2.191 1.800 1.732 X
a3k0 1.847 1.989 2.130 2.005 2.149 2.293 1.722 1.866 2.011 2.000 1.732 X
a2k2 1.895 2.072 2.249 2.019 2.146 2.272 1.907 2.105 2.302 2.100 2.000 X
a4k0 1.700 1.947 2.194 2.201 2.495 2.790 2.085 2.360 2.634 2.500 2.000 X
O
LS
10
0
a1k0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.00
a2k0 1.311 1.338 1.364 1.359 1.380 1.401 1.363 1.390 1.418 1.500 1.414 1.34
a2k1 1.497 1.543 1.589 1.698 1.740 1.783 1.647 1.715 1.782 1.800 1.732 1.64
a3k0 1.541 1.581 1.620 1.582 1.623 1.664 1.613 1.659 1.705 2.000 1.732 1.52
a2k2 1.648 1.697 1.745 1.811 1.852 1.892 1.778 1.841 1.904 2.100 2.000 1.78
a4k0 1.605 1.661 1.716 1.790 1.856 1.922 1.943 2.023 2.103 2.500 2.000 1.73
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EU-SILC 2005–2012 data.
